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THE UNDERSIGNED ATTORNEY HEREBY CERTIFIES: 
ENSURING REASONABLE CASELOADS FOR 
WASHINGTON DEFENDERS AND CLIENTS 
Andrea Woods* 
The point here is that the system is broken to such an extent that 
confidential attorney/client communications are rare, the individual 
defendant is not represented in any meaningful way, and actual 
innocence could conceivably go unnoticed and unchampioned. 
—Judge Robert S. Lasnik1 
INTRODUCTION 
Santos Rivas was appointed a defense attorney in Yakima County in 
August 1999.2 About a month later, he appeared in court.3 Upon arrival, 
Rivas discovered that his public defender, Steven Michels, was now 
presiding over his case as judge.4 Then-Judge Michels persuaded Rivas 
not only to fire Michels as his attorney, but also to plead guilty to all 
charges.5 Judge Michels did not inform Rivas of his right to appoint new 
counsel and pressured his former client to proceed without an attorney in 
his guilty plea.6 
In 1997, Keith Roberts faced criminal charges in Grant County 
Superior Court.7 Unable to afford his own attorney, he was appointed 
one.8 His attorney, Guillermo Romero, failed to object when the 
* The author has worked previously with the Alaska Public Defender Agency, the Innocence 
Project Northwest, and the Metropolitan Public Defender in Portland, Oregon. 
1. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL, 2013 WL 6275319, at *4 (W.D. Wash. 
Dec. 4, 2013). 
2. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Michels, 150 Wash. 2d 159, 167–68, 75 P.3d 950, 954 
(2003) (discussing City of Toppenish v. Rivas, Nos. C00006564, C00006565, C00006566, 
(Toppenish Mun. Ct. Sept. 13, 1999)). 
3. Id. at 168, 75 P.3d at 954. 
4. Id. 
5. See id. 
6. See id. at 168, 75 P.3d at 954–55. 
7. See generally State v. Roberts, No. 16586-8-III, 1999 WL 543835 (Wash. Ct. App. July 27, 
1999). 
8. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Romero, 152 Wash. 2d 124, 127, 94 P.3d 939, 940 
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prosecution compared Roberts to Hitler.9 Romero misled Roberts’ 
mother into paying hundreds of dollars.10 Roberts is required to register 
as a level-III sex offender.11 His appointed counsel, Guillermo Romero, 
has since been disbarred.12 
Joseph Jerome Wilbur faced numerous criminal charges in Mount 
Vernon between 2006 and 2009.13 His public defender, Richard 
Sybrandy, never spoke with Wilbur unless they were at a court 
hearing.14 Sybrandy failed to respond to his client’s notes and phone 
calls, presenting Wilbur with only one option: to plead guilty.15 During 
that time, Mount Vernon and Burlington relied on two attorneys, 
Richard Sybrandy and Morgan Witt, for the cities’ entire misdemeanor 
defense caseloads.16 Sybrandy and Witt were responsible for 
approximately 2100 cases in 2010, while additionally maintaining 
private practices.17 
Fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court decided Gideon v. 
Wainwright.18 Gideon and its progeny established that indigent persons 
accused of crimes are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel 
under the Sixth Amendment.19 Yet today, criminal defendants often face 
charges with little help from the attorneys appointed to defend them.20 
(2004). 
9. Roberts, 1999 WL 543835, at *11–12. 
10. In re Romero, 152 Wash. 2d at 127–128, 94 P.3d at 940–41. 
11. See Ken Armstrong et al., For Some, Free Counsel Comes at a High Cost, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Apr. 4, 2004), http://seattletimes.com/news/local/unequaldefense/stories/one; National Sex 
Offender Search, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.nsopw.gov/en-US/Search (search for “Keith 
Roberts” in Grant County). 
12. See In re Romero, 152 Wash. 2d 124, 94 P.3d 939. 
13. Declaration of Plaintiff at 2, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL, 2012 WL 
600727 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 2013). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C11-
1100RSL, 2012 WL 600727 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 2013) (Sybrandy and Witt handled all of the 
cases in these jurisdictions except when an actual conflict of interest existed). 
17. Id. at 4. 
18. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
19. See generally Lafler v. Cooper, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (acknowledging that the 
right to effective counsel includes effective representation in pre-trial matters, including plea 
bargaining); Missouri v. Frye, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (same); Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that appointed counsel must be “effective”); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that the right to counsel extends to those facing misdemeanor charges 
for which a term of imprisonment is possible). 
20. See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, Robert C. Boruchowitz & Norman L. Reimer, Foreword to JOEL 
M. SCHUMM, NATIONAL INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM: THE SOLUTION IS MULTIFACETED 5 (Am. 
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Roberts and Rivas are two examples of clients who received 
representation that fell short of the caliber of defense anticipated by the 
Gideon Court.21 Across the nation, systemic factors—including but not 
limited to the limitations inherent in public funding, caseload 
management, and a lack of oversight—contribute to failures in 
delivering the poor person’s right to a fair trial.22 
Washington State is no exception. For example, a King County 
defendant facing felony charges receives appointed counsel whose 
caseload would enable her to spend, on average, 13.9 hours23 devoted to 
his defense.24 In contrast, defendants in Cowlitz County are appointed 
counsel who can devote only about 3.6 hours to their defense.25 In other 
words, persons charged with crimes demanding a similarly nuanced 
defense, would be assisted to very different degrees by virtue of their 
geography: one person’s attorney could assess, negotiate, and investigate 
the case against her client while another defendant would in all 
likelihood be rushed into a plea deal.26 Lisa Tabbut, a former Cowlitz 
Bar Ass’n 2012). 
21. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (anticipating defense counsel that “has . . . skill in the science of 
law,” is capable of determining the viability of claims against the defendant, and understands the 
rules of evidence (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932))). 
22. See ACLU OF WASH., THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF GIDEON: WASHINGTON’S FLAWED 
SYSTEM OF PUBLIC DEFENSE FOR THE POOR 8–9, 10–11 (2004) [hereinafter UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE]. 
23. For purposes of comparison, calculations for the hourly figures in this section are based on an 
assumption that there are 2,087 work hours per year. This is the number used to determine federal 
employees’ pay rates, although many public defense attorneys may work more or fewer than 2,087 
hours annually. See Letter from Milton J. Socolow, Acting Comptroller Gen. of the U.S., to Hon. 
Mary Rose Oakar, Chair, Subcommittee on Compensation and Employee Benefits, Committee on 
Post Office and Civil Service, U.S.H.R., at 3 (Aug. 26, 1981) (on file with author) (recommending, 
as an option, that Congress calculate based on 2,087 work hours per year as the average number of 
work hours over a 28-year calendar cycle), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5504 (2012). 
24. King County caps felony caseloads at 150 per year. See UNFULFILLED PROMISE, supra note 
22, at 14; see also WASH. DEFENDER ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE SERVICES 10 
(2007), available at http://www.defensenet.org/resources/publications-1/wda-standards-for-
indigent-defense (last visited Jan. 15, 2014); Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief by The 
Washington Defender Association, Jerome Joseph Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. 11-
1100RSL, at *2–3 (providing history of WDA standards and confirming that a relevant version was 
published in 2007). 
25. Ken Armstrong & Justin Mayo, Frustrated Attorney: ‘You Just Can’t Help People,’ SEATTLE 
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2004), http://seattletimes.com/news/local/unequaldefense/stories/three (Lisa 
Tabbut’s annual 587 cases is used as an illustration). 
26. See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE 
TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 31–34 (2009) (providing statistics and 
interviews regarding the tendency to “meet and plead” clients. Of New York City’s misdemeanor 
caseload in 2000, 70% of cases were resolved with guilty pleas at the defense attorney’s first 
appearance—often in no more than ten minutes total—in a process described by Judge Joseph 
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County public defender, described managing her annual caseload of 276 
dependency cases, 295 juvenile cases, and 16 criminal appeals as 
“malpractice per se.”27 In Mount Vernon and Burlington, the excessive 
caseloads of defense attorneys “systemically deprived [defendants] of 
the assistance of counsel at critical stages of the prosecution,” according 
to United States District Court Judge Robert Lasnik.28 While some 
defendants face criminal charges without legal guidance at all,29 this 
Comment is focused on those defendants who receive appointed counsel 
burdened by an excessive caseload. In order to ensure an effective 
defense, Washington defenders must have the time and resources to 
devote to adequate investigation, counseling, negotiation, and 
preparation—a feat not possible in the few hours available to public 
defenders in some counties.30 Though the Gideon Court did not identify 
specific caseload caps, the evolution of public defense in Washington—
and throughout the country—has made such restrictions necessary to 
prevent public defense from being compromised by either the inherent 
limitations on overworked attorneys or, even worse, by for-profit 
gamesmanship.31 
To address these issues, the Washington State Supreme Court issued a 
Bellacosa as “meet ‘em, greet ‘em, and plead ‘em.” During an observation of the Lynnwood, 
Washington, Municipal Court, two contract attorneys advised as many as 132 clients in three and a 
half hours—just over three minutes for each client to meet with counsel, assuming each attorney 
handled 66 cases. Another Washington defender told reporters that out of his annual caseload of 900 
misdemeanors, only nine, or one percent, were taken to trial. While beyond the scope of this 
Comment, this problem is exacerbated by the difficulty of meeting bail; defendants who cannot 
afford to bail out of custody are, generally, more likely to seek out and accept rushed plea deals in 
this manner.). 
27. Armstrong & Mayo, supra note 25. 
28. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL, 2013 WL 6275319, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 
Dec. 4, 2013). The U.S. Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest in the outcome of this 
litigation. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 3, Wilbur, 2013 WL 6275319 (“The 
United States has an interest in ensuring that all jurisdictions—federal, state, and local—are 
fulfilling their obligation under the Constitution to provide effective assistance of counsel to 
individuals facing criminal charges who cannot afford an attorney, as required by Gideon v. 
Wainwright . . . .”). The Wilbur case is discussed further infra Part III.D. 
29. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Michels, 150 Wash. 2d 159, 167–68, 75 P.3d 
950, 954 (2003) (discussing City of Toppenish v. Rivas, Nos. C00006564, C00006565, C00006566, 
(Toppenish Mun. Ct. Sept. 13, 1999)) (Santos Rivas was urged by his former defense attorney to 
plead guilty unrepresented). While it is beyond the scope of this Comment, a recent piece of 
proposed legislation would make the determination of indigency for the purposes of receiving a 
public defender even more difficult by amending RCW section 10.101.020(2). See also S.B. 5020, 
63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013). 
30. See Letter from Milton J. Socolow, supra note 23 (addressing the time calculations for 
defense caseloads). 
31. See infra Part I.A. 
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historic order on June 15, 2012.32 The order requires appointed defense 
attorneys to certify that they comply with requirements set by the 
Court.33 To comply with these requirements, attorneys must be 
specifically qualified to handle their cases, must have access to an office, 
and—most controversially—must limit their annual caseload.34 The 
court rule creating mandatory Standards for Indigent Defense35 
(hereinafter “the Standards”), except for Standard 3.4 pertaining to 
caseload limits, originally became effective on January 1, 2013.36 Many 
Washington trial courts have already conducted the attorney certification 
process.37 As of October 1, 2013, attorneys must certify compliance with 
the Standards, save Standard 3.4 which will not take statewide effect 
until January of 2015.38 Whether or not enforcement for noncompliance 
will prove effective is one of the potential weaknesses of the 
Standards.39 
The Standards governing Washington’s public defenders40 represent a 
significant reform aimed at protecting an important constitutional right 
32. See In the Matter of the Adoption of New Standards for Indigent Defense and Certification of 
Compliance, Order No. 25700-A-1004 (Wash. June 15, 2012) [hereinafter Adoption of New 
Standards]. 
33. This certification requirement is codified in amended WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.1(d)(4), 
WASH. CRIM. R. CT. LTD. JURIS. 3.1(d)(4), and WASH. JUV. CT. R. 9.2(d)(1).  
34. See WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., 2011 STATUS REPORT ON PUBLIC DEFENSE IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 10, available at http://www.opd.wa.gov/documents/0060-
2011_StatusReport.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) [hereinafter OPD REPORT] (“Standard 
3.4 . . . proved to be the most critical and controversial issue considered for implementation”). 
35. The author uses the term “Standards” to refer only to those Standards for Indigent Defense 
adopted by the State Supreme Court in June 2012. Other versions are referred to as “guidelines” or 
“best practices” to avoid confusion. 
36. See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.1; WASH. CRIM. R. CT. LTD. JURIS. 3.1; WASH. JUV. CT. R. 
9.2.  
37. See OPD REPORT, supra note 34, at 9 (explaining how trial courts will oversee certification); 
E-mail from Ann Christian, Clark County Indigent Defense Coordinator, to author (Apr. 1, 2013, 
4:01 PST) (on file with author). 
38. See Frequently Asked Questions Related to Implementation of the Standards for Indigent 
Defense as Adopted by the Washington Supreme Court, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF. (Sept. 
30, 2013), http://www.opd.wa.gov/index.php/12-pd/129-faq-standards. The Court recently issued 
another order requiring OPD to conduct a time study in order to determine how misdemeanor cases 
should be weighted; the annual limits on caseload standards will thus become effective January 
2015. The other requirements of the Standards must be certified as of October 1, 2013. In the Matter 
of the Standards for Indigent Defense Implementation of CrR 3.1(d), JuCR 9.2(d), and CrRLJ 
3.1(d), Order No. 25700-A-1016 (Wash. Apr. 8, 2013) [hereinafter Indigent Defense 
Implementation].  
39. See infra Part IV.A.  
40. The author uses the term “public defender” to apply to those in an organized public defender 
office, those accepting cases through individual appointment by the courts, and those in a contract 
with the courts to provide representation in a certain number of cases per year. 
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for our state’s vulnerable citizens. This Comment provides the necessary 
introduction to the Standards and addresses skepticism on the part of 
current practitioners and elected officials. Cooperation among defense 
attorneys, local governments, and the courts could ensure the Standards’ 
success and—in turn—a better system of public defense for attorneys 
and defendants alike.41 
Part I of this Comment introduces the reader to the new Standards. 
Part II offers an overview of common critiques of the Washington State 
Supreme Court Standards that were voiced by practitioners prior to the 
Standards’ issuance. Part III explains what has happened since the 
Standards have become effective—whether the critics’ warnings or the 
believers’ hopes have come to pass. Part IV identifies problems with the 
Standards. Finally, Part V suggests potential improvements in light of 
those problems: creating a meaningful enforcement mechanism, locating 
adequate funding for public defense, and weighting cases appropriately. 
I. THE STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE 
A. The Structure of Public Defense in Washington Is Decentralized 
The first public defender offices in Washington date back to the 
1960s.42 Funding and oversight for Washington’s public defense system 
is delegated to local jurisdictions, meaning that public defense is run 
primarily at the county level.43 However, local control of public defense 
is not a gold standard: 22 states employ a state-implemented system with 
41. And, like many other reforms, the existence of criticism is not surprising. See, e.g., Helen 
Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. 
REV. 293, 294–95 (1986) (pointing out the criticisms of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. 
REV. 581, 584 (2009) (noting the initial unpopularity of criminal reforms to redefine rape); Reginald 
Oh, Interracial Marriage in the Shadows of Jim Crow: Racial Segregation as a System of Racial 
and Gender Subordination, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1321, 1329 (2006) (mentioning critical views of 
movements towards desegregation and interracial marriage rights); see infra Part II (discussing 
criticisms of the Standards). 
42. See Robert C. Boruchowitz, State Supreme Court Issues Historic Order on Defense 
Standards, 31 KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N BAR BULL. 1, 10 (2012); see also Marc Boman, WSBA 
Council on Public Defense, Presentation to Washington Legislative Staff Academy, at 3 (Oct. 4, 
2012) [hereinafter Boman]. By 1968, problems in the delivery of indigent defense for persons 
accused of misdemeanors had already been identified by Washington scholars. See John M. Junker, 
The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L. REV. 685, 685 (1968). 
43. See OPD REPORT, supra note 34, at 8 (describing how OPD administers funds to counties and 
cities); DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COUNTY-
BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007, at 1 fig.1 (2007). 
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one office providing oversight.44 State-based public defender programs 
appear on the whole to provide more resources, such as investigators, to 
their offices.45 
There are three methods through which an attorney may find herself 
practicing public defense in Washington. First, an attorney might work 
in an organized office of public defense, a local government, or 
nonprofit organization.46 Second, a private attorney may be assigned to a 
case by a trial court.47 Third, a private attorney could have a contract 
with the local court system to represent a regular number of clients.48 
Depending on which category an attorney belongs to, the new Standards 
adopted by the Washington State Supreme Court may appear (at least 
from the individual attorney’s perspective) to have more drastic 
implications.49 
The majority50 of Washington counties use a private contract system 
for their public defenders, thus falling into the second or third category 
mentioned above.51 These public defenders share a number of 
characteristics. Most maintain a private practice while defending 
indigent clients.52 Many have ignored caseload limit suggestions—
despite a statute encouraging local jurisdictions to adopt caseload 
limits53 for indigent defense attorneys, those limits were only guidelines 
44. DONALD J. FAROLE, JR. & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007 at 1 (2007). 
45. Compare FAROLE & LANGTON, supra note 43, at 1, with FAROLE & LANGTON, supra note 44, 
at 1, 14. 
46. FAROLE & LANGTON, supra note 43, at 3; see also WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., 2012 
STATUS REPORT ON PUBLIC DEFENSE IN WASHINGTON STATE 11, available at 
http://www.opd.wa.gov/documents/0095-2012_Status_Report.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2014) (map 
demonstrating that Washington counties may use one of the listed types of appointed counsel). 
47. FAROLE & LANGTON, supra note 43, at 3. 
48. Id. 
49. For example, before the Standards were implemented, the nonprofit public defense offices in 
King County already followed the same caseload limits for their public defenders. See 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE, supra note 22, at 18. Spokane County’s office of public defense, too, 
implemented guidelines for caseload limits and compensation before the Standards created a 
mandate. See SPOKANE CNTY., STANDARDS FOR THE DELIVERY OF INDIGENT DEFENDER SERVICES 
(2012), available at http://www.spokanecounty.org/pubdefender/content.aspx?c=1927 (last visited 
Feb. 13, 2013). The Standards represent a mere administrative change, annual certification, for these 
persons. 
50. Twenty-four of thirty-nine. UNFULFILLED PROMISE, supra note 22, at 17. 
51. See id.  
52. Id. at 5. 
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.030 (1989) (“The standards endorsed by the Washington state 
bar association for the provision of public defense services may serve as guidelines . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
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and lacked a meaningful enforcement mechanism.54 As of 2003, only 
King County had incorporated the caseload limits suggested—but not 
required—by state statute and the Washington State Bar Association 
(WSBA).55 
The use of flat-fee contracts in Washington has engendered perverse 
incentives for some public defenders. For example, Grant County 
previously had a $500,000 contract for the total of its criminal defense 
representation.56 This created conflicting motivations for public defender 
Thomas Earl, who administered the indigent defense contract: incentives 
to (1) handle as many of Grant County’s cases as he could in order to 
retain as much of that $500,000 as possible, and (2) hire additional 
attorneys to handle overflow cases who would work for the least 
compensation rather than those most qualified.57 His failure to 
adequately represent clients, coupled with financial dishonesty, 
eventually led to Earl’s disbarment.58 Similar conduct—arguably also 
motivated by a flat-fee contract system—by longtime Grant County 
Public Defender Guillermo Romero resulted in his disbarment as well.59 
Flat-fee contracts, aggravated by a lack of caseload limits, had 
negative effects on attorneys. Even in counties with no overt corruption, 
the use of flat fees resulted in drastic under-compensation of defense 
attorneys.60 For example, Cowlitz County Public Defender Lisa Tabbut 
received approximately $150 per case while doing the work of two or 
three full-time defenders.61 In light of the examples of Earl and Tabbut,62 
54. UNFULFILLED PROMISE, supra note 22, at 7–8. 
55. Id. at 18. One of the additional attorneys hired by Earl was Guillermo Romero, discussed in 
the Introduction. See also Ken Armstrong et al., Attorney Profited, but His Clients Lost, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2004), http://seattletimes.com/news/local/unequaldefense/stories/two/. 
56. Armstrong et al., supra note 55. 
57. See id.; see also In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Romero, 152 Wash. 2d. 124, 128–29, 
94 P.3d 939, 941 (2004) (Guillermo Romero, discussed in the Introduction, supra, was one of the 
employees hired by Thomas Earl). 
58. See Discipline Notice – Thomas Jay Earl, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.mywsba.org/DisciplineNotice/DisciplineDetail.aspx?dID=594 (last visited Jan. 16, 
2014). 
59. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Romero, 152 Wash. 2d 124, 128, 94 P.3d 939, 940–41 
(2004). The reader may at first glance believe disbarment signals that the system is working. This 
logic, however, is misguided for two reasons. First, disbarment is a rare sanction. See WASH. STATE 
BAR ASS’N, 2011 LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT 9, 23 (2011) (in 2011, the WSBA 
received 2156 grievances but there were only 19 disbarments). Second, these disciplinary 
procedures come too late to provide poor defendants with their constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel.  
60. See Armstrong & Mayo, supra note 25. 
61. Id. 
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it comes as no surprise that mandated Standards for Indigent Defense 
had been in the works for years.63 
B. Before the Standards: Attempted Reforms Fell Short 
Though voluntary guidelines existed64 before the Washington State 
Supreme Court implemented the Standards, those guidelines were rarely 
followed.65 All told, the Standards were developed over nearly thirty 
years, beginning with reform efforts in King County and developed by 
the Washington Defender Association.66 
In 1982, in response to local concern67 that the Seattle Municipal 
Court issued no more than “supermarket justice,” the King County Bar 
Association (KCBA) set guidelines for its public defense attorneys, 
including case limit guidelines.68 As a report described the Seattle 
Municipal Court, “Court officials inform defendants of their rights over 
loudspeakers. ‘The need to “process cases” has clearly taken precedence 
over the obligation to [dispense] justice.’”69 
In 1984, the Washington Defender Association published its own best 
practices, developed from those set forth by the KCBA, and the WSBA 
endorsed them.70 These guidelines set forth annual limits on public 
defense attorneys’ caseloads.71 Earlier indigent defense guidelines 
included similar provisions to the recently enacted standards, including 
provisions for attorney compensation and caseload caps.72 However, 
they lacked an enforcement mechanism and were treated as best 
62. Even in counties with assigned offices of public defense or where the court assigns attorneys 
to cases one-by-one, the consistency and quality control provided by the Standards still provide 
important protections and more careful oversight. See, e.g., Adoption of New Standards, supra note 
32 (The Standards’ purpose is to effectuate “quality representation,” defined as “the minimum level 
of attention, care, and skill that Washington citizens would expect of their state’s criminal justice 
system.”). 
63. See generally Boman, supra note 42. Generally, other systems of public defender 
appointment came with more structure, with public defender agencies providing the most stability 
and oversight. Id. at 6. 
64. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.030 (2005). 
65. See generally UNFULFILLED PROMISE, supra note 22. 
66. See Boruchowitz, supra note 42, at 1, 10. 
67. Id. at 1.  
68. Id.  
69. Id. 
70. See Boman, supra note 42, at 3. 
71. Boruchowitz, supra note 42, at 1, 10. 
72. WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES at 1, 4 (2011) (the 
WSBA’s standards reference the Seattle-King County Standards that they draw upon). 
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practices rather than requirements.73 As a result, no jurisdiction but King 
County followed these guidelines.74 
The state legislature also made efforts to create standards. In 1989, 
the Legislature passed a statute75 requiring local governments to create 
public defense guidelines. The statute provided that “[t]he standards 
endorsed by the Washington state bar association . . . may serve as 
guidelines to contracting authorities.”76 This language went easily 
ignored; it did not require local jurisdictions to follow the best practices 
set forth by the WSBA. As a result, most jurisdictions did not limit the 
annual caseloads of public defenders.77 
Next, the Legislature created a statewide Office of Public Defense 
(OPD).78 At first, the legislature tasked the OPD only with fulfilling the 
“powers, duties, and functions of the supreme court . . . pertaining to 
appellate indigent defense.”79 It was not until 2005 that the legislature 
gave the OPD the broader function it now serves: overseeing public 
defense funding and delivery statewide.80 
These efforts to improve public defense were—not surprisingly—
unsuccessful.81 By 2004, Washington State was not meeting its 
obligation to ensure consistent and effective assistance of counsel to all 
of its citizens. That year, both the ACLU of Washington82 and the 
Seattle Times83 issued reports on the defects in Washington’s indigent 
defense system. These reports exposed gaping holes in the delivery of 
effective assistance of counsel; many defendants were being hurriedly 
ushered through the justice system, often receiving no more than a 
rudimentary defense.84 For example, the ACLU describes a Chelan 
73. See Boruchowitz, supra note 42, at 10. 
74. See UNFULFILLED PROMISE, supra note 22, at 18. 
75. Act of May 13, 1989, ch. 409 § 4, 1989 WASH. SESS. LAWS 2205, 2207–08 (codified as 
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.030 (1989)). 
76. Id. (emphasis added).  
77. See UNFULFILLED PROMISE, supra note 22, at 18–19 (only King County adopted the WSBA 
limits, though Benton, Clark, Island, San Juan, and Snohomish Counties had some caseload limits 
by 2004). 
78. See Act of March 28, 1996, ch. 221, 1996 WASH. SESS. LAWS 961 (codified as amended at 
WASH. REV. CODE § 2.70.050 (2005)). 
79. Id. § 6(1) (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 2.70.050 (1996)). 
80. See Act of May 4, 2005, ch. 282, 2005 WASH. SESS. LAWS 1052; see also generally WASH. 
STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., supra note 46. 
81. See generally UNFULFILLED PROMISE, supra note 22; Armstrong et al., supra note 11. 
82. See generally UNFULFILLED PROMISE, supra note 22. 
83. Armstrong et al., supra note 11; Armstrong & Mayo, supra note 25; Armstrong et al., supra 
note 55.  
84. See generally UNFULFILLED PROMISE, supra note 22; Armstrong et al., supra note 11; 
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County defendant’s plight: 
[T]he defense attorney failed to interview witnesses, failed to 
prepare for key hearings, failed to prepare defendants to testify 
and coerced a defendant to plead guilty to 23 counts of incest 
and child rape. When the defendant later obtained new counsel 
to challenge his guilty pleas, the prosecutor promptly conceded 
that the defendant had been deprived of effective assistance of 
counsel.85 
The serious problems with public defense spurred the Washington 
legal community to action. In 2003, the WSBA Board of Governors 
established a Blue Ribbon Panel on Criminal Defense to study the public 
defense system.86 The panel identified four major flaws with 
Washington’s public defense delivery system: (1) it did not effectively 
limit annual caseloads; (2) it was inadequately funded; (3) it improperly 
utilized a flat-fee contract scheme; and (4) it lacked enforceability.87 In 
light of the flaws identified by the Blue Ribbon Panel, the Legislature 
amended the statute regarding public defense standards, which had 
previously been ineffective,88 in 2005: “The standards endorsed by the 
Washington state bar association . . . may should serve as guidelines to 
contracting local legislative authorities in adopting standards.”89 The 
WSBA also created a Council on Public Defense (CPD) to review and 
draft standards to be endorsed as per the statute’s recommendation.90 
The CPD reviewed existing public defense guidelines, including those 
established by the Washington Defender Association in 1984.91 
The Washington State Supreme Court moved the conversation 
forward in its 2010 decision, State v. A.N.J.,92 where it addressed an 
Armstrong & Mayo, supra note 25; Armstrong et al., supra note 55. 
85. UNFULFILLED PROMISE, supra note 22, at 6. 
86. Council on Public Defense, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://www.wsba.org/Legal-
Community/Committees-Boards-and-Other-Groups/Council-on-Public-Defense (last visited Jan. 17, 
2014). 
87. Boman, supra note 42, at 6. 
88. See generally UNFULFILLED PROMISE, supra note 22. 
89. Act of Apr. 22, 2005, ch. 157 § 2, 2005 WASH. SESS. LAWS 542–43 (codified at WASH. REV. 
CODE § 10.101.030 (2005)) (strikethrough indicating text removed and italics indicating text 
added). 
90. WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 86 (Council created to “implement the 
recommendations of the . . . Blue Ribbon Panel.”). 
91. The 1984 guidelines are substantially similar to the Standards adopted by the Supreme Court, 
providing guidance regarding attorney compensation, caseload, and administrative costs. WASH. 
DEFENDER ASS’N, supra note 24, at 1, 4, 10–12, 51. 
92. 168 Wash. 2d 91, 225 P.3d 956 (2010). 
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ineffective assistance of counsel claim.93 Criminal defendant A.N.J. 
entered a guilty plea to a first-degree child molestation charge—without 
understanding its severe consequences—when he was only 12 years 
old.94 A.N.J.’s court-appointed defense attorney did not conduct a 
meaningful investigation or consult with experts, and A.N.J. was not 
advised of the ramifications of his guilty plea.95 While A.N.J. did not 
directly relate to the formation of formal public defense standards, the 
Court’s decision demonstrated its renewed interest in tackling the 
problem of over-burdened public defenders.96 Though stopping short of 
mandating compliance with caseload standards to find a defender’s 
representation effective, the Court indicated that compliance may be 
considered: “While we do not adopt the WDA Standards for Public 
Defense Services, we hold they, and certainly the bar association’s 
standards, may be considered with other evidence concerning the 
effective assistance of counsel.”97 This language indicates that 
compliance with the new Standards may have a bearing on ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in the future.98 
C. The Washington State Supreme Court Created a Court Rule to 
Effectuate Compliance with Standards 
Shortly after A.N.J., the Washington State Supreme Court issued an 
order to regulate public defense attorneys.99 Pursuant to its power over 
courts and attorneys, the Court enacted an identical amendment to three 
court rules. The amendment provides: 
Before appointing a lawyer for an indigent person or at the first 
appearance of the lawyer in the case, the court shall require the 
lawyer to certify to the court that he or she complies with the 
applicable Standards for Indigent Defense Services to be 
approved by the Supreme Court.100 
93. Id. at 96, 225 P.3d at 959. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 96, 109, 225 P.3d at 959, 965. 
96. Id. at 110, 225 P.3d at 965. 
97. Id. at 110, 225 P.2d at 966. 
98. See id. 
99. Codified in amendments to WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.1(d)(4) (“Right to and Assignment 
of Lawyer”), WASH. CRIM. R. CT. LTD. JURIS. 3.1(d)(4) (“Right to and Assignment of Lawyer”), 
and WASH. JUV. CT. R. 9.2(d)(1) (“Additional Right to Representation by Lawyer”); see also 
Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32. 
100. WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.1(d)(4); WASH. CRIM. R. CT. LTD. JURIS. 3.1(d)(4); WASH. 
JUV. CT. R. 9.2(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
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This amendment required the Court to approve a set of Standards for 
Indigent Defense, and the Court invited the WSBA’s CPD to draft the 
new guidelines.101 Members of the CPD looked to existing standards and 
other national surveys in order to create Washington’s rules.102 The 
Court ordered the standards be published for a three-month comment 
period to gather public feedback and promote transparency.103 After the 
comment period some adjustments were made,104 and the Court adopted 
final Standards in June 2012.105 
D. Introduction to the Standards Adopted by the Court 
The Standards add an administrative requirement for public defense 
attorneys: regular certification.106 Because the Court may not regulate 
counties or cities—its rulemaking power is confined to attorneys and 
courts—the Standards are aimed at practitioners.107 The Court has 
exclusive power to discipline and regulate members of the Washington 
Bar.108 
No one may practice law in Washington State without complying 
with rules set forth by the Washington State Supreme Court.109 A 
familiar area in which this power is exercised is the existence of a 
101. Boman, supra note 42, at 12; see also Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at 6 
(discussing “related standards”). 
102. See Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at 6 (discussing “related standards”). 
103. See Proposed Rules of Court – Published for Comment Only, WASH. COURTS, 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.proposed (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) 
(explaining how to submit comments and indicating that there is a limited comment period). 
104. Compare Proposed New Rule CrR 3.1 Stds – Standards for Indigent Defense, WASH. 
COURTS, available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules. 
proposedRuleDisplayArchive&ruleId=261 (“Standard 5.2 . . . : Public defense attorneys shall have 
an office . . . .”), with Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standard 5.2.B. (“Public 
defense attorneys shall have access to an office . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
105. Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32. 
106. An original version of the rule would have had judges perform this certification. The judicial 
community quickly expressed its dissatisfaction with the proposal and it was changed to have 
attorneys personally certify as to their compliance with required standards. See Certification of 
Compliance, Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at 13. 
107. Preamble to Standards on Indigent Defense, Order No. 25700-A-1008 (Wash. Sept. 7, 2012) 
(“[T]he Court recognizes the authority of its Rules is limited to attorneys and the courts.”) 
(hereinafter Preamble). 
108. See The Discipline System, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-
Lawyer-Conduct/Discipline (last visited Jan.18, 2014). 
109. See, e.g., Admission to Practice Rule 1(a) (“The Supreme Court of Washington has the 
exclusive responsibility and the inherent power to establish the qualifications for admission to 
practice law . . . . Any person carrying out the [practice of law] is acting under the authority and at 
the direction of the Supreme Court.”). 
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Continuing Legal Education (CLE) requirement for practicing 
attorneys.110 The Washington State Supreme Court may suspend 
attorneys who fail to comply with the CLE certification requirement 
from practicing law.111 
Because the Standards for Indigent Defense match the WSBA 
guidelines,112 attorneys in counties already following the WSBA’s 
recommended indigent defense guidelines will not need to reduce their 
workload, but simply certify their compliance each quarter.113 Those 
whose annual caseloads exceed the maximum provided by the Standards 
will need to bring their workload into compliance by the time the 
standards go into effect in 2015.114 
The Standards make four primary changes that affect attorneys 
differently, depending on how the attorneys are assigned cases and 
compensated: (1) caseload limits and weighting;115 (2) limits on private 
practice work that may be accepted in addition to an indigent defense 
caseload; (3) administrative cost provisions; and (4) qualification of 
attorneys.116 
1. Caseload Limits and Weighting 
Caseload limits are the most hotly debated portion of the Standards.117 
The Court places responsibility on attorneys to accept only workloads 
that may be managed while providing “quality representation.”118 With 
the goal of ensuring that the criminal justice system works to protect 
Washington citizens by creating manageable workloads for attorneys, 
the Court prescribes limits and calculations for public defenders’ annual 
caseloads.119 
110. Admission to Practice Rule 11.2(a) (“Each active member of the Bar Association . . . must 
complete . . . minimum . . . credit hours of accredited legal education . . . .”). 
111. Admission to Practice Rule 11.6(c). 
112. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.101.030 (2005). 
113. See Certificate of Compliance, Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at 13. 
114. Standard 3.4 pertaining to caseload limits took effect on October 1, 2013. Misdemeanor 
caseloads must be in compliance in January 2015. See Indigent Defense Implementation, supra note 
38. 
115. Meaning, to count a case as more or less than one depending on its complexity. 
116. See Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32. 
117. See infra Part II. 
118. See Preamble, supra note 107; Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standard 3.2 
(defining “quality representation” as “the minimum level of attention, care, and skill that 
Washington citizens would expect of their state’s criminal justice system”). 
119. Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standards 3.3–3.6. 
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Standard 3.4 imposes specific numerical maximums for public 
defenders.120 For example, a full-time public defender is limited to 150 
felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 250 juvenile cases, or 36 appeals per 
year.121 There is no indication that the Washington State Supreme Court 
expects an attorney to limit herself exclusively to one type of caseload 
(e.g., felonies only).122 Rather, cases of different magnitudes are to be 
weighted with these maximums in mind and each attorney is to accept 
no more than these maximums or a “proportional mix of different types 
of cases.”123 
Local jurisdictions have the option of assigning weights to various 
cases, depending on the cases’ complexity and the attorney’s 
experience.124 The local government or entity responsible for contracting 
indigent defense cases is responsible for case weighting.125 Case 
weighting is optional, not mandatory.126 Case weighting structures are 
subject to review by the Office of Public Defense and must comply both 
with the purpose of the Standards (e.g., by not allowing attorneys to 
spend less time than necessary on their cases) and the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.127 Serious criminal charges or complicated 
investigations may require attorneys to weight a case as more than one 
when calculating annual caseload.128 The more likely occurrence is that 
cases will be weighted downward, as constituting less than a full case.129 
The Court contemplates case weighting downward in such cases as the 
representation of material witnesses or arraignments.130 However, the 
Court advises, “care must be taken because many such representations 
routinely involve significant work[.]”131 If cases are weighted, the 
120. Id. at Standard 3.4. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at Standards 3.4–3.6. 
123. Boman, supra note 42, at 24 (quoting Certification of Compliance, Adoption of New 
Standards, supra note 32, at 13). 
124. See Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standards 3.4–3.5. 
125. Id. at Standard 3.5. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at Standard 3.5.B, D. The Office of Public Defense has wide authority to grant funding 
and support to jurisdictions for public defense purposes—while direct review of case weighting 
structures may not be explicitly tied to the decision to provide a jurisdiction with funding, it is 
clearly a component of the OPD’s review. See Indigent Defense Implementation, supra note 38 
(case weighting is an area monitored primarily by OPD). 
128. Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standard 3.6.A. 
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annual misdemeanor limit is 300.132 A local jurisdiction’s case-
weighting system is subject to review by the OPD.133 If local 
governments fail to adopt case-weighting procedures, attorneys are 
limited to the 400 misdemeanors per year described in Standard 3.4.134 
The Standards authorize jurisdictions to weight a case as either more or 
less than one case depending on its complexity.135 
2. Limitation on Private Practice 
Standard 13 imposes new limits on private practice: “Private 
attorneys who provide public defense representation shall set limits on 
the amount of privately retained work which can be accepted. These 
limits shall be based on the percentage of a full-time caseload which the 
public defense cases represent.”136 This Standard addresses the common 
practice of accepting private practice work on top of a public defender 
caseload.137 While attorneys are not prohibited from accepting private 
work under the new Standards, they must calculate the percentage of a 
full-time workload they accept as public defenders.138 For example, a 
defense attorney who represents ninety clients facing felony charges per 
year is at sixty percent of a full-time defender caseload (which is 150 
felony representations). This attorney may work about forty percent of 
full-time in private practice and remain in compliance with the court 
rules. 
3. Administrative Cost Provisions 
The Standards ask that local governments cover certain administrative 
expenses for public defenders. Rather than asking attorneys to pay 
overhead costs out of their paycheck, Standard 5.2 asks local 
government entities to adequately fund such necessities as travel, 
offices, research, supplies, and training.139 
This standard may put public defense attorneys in a difficult position 
because—as the Court acknowledged—the Court’s authority is limited 
132. Id. at Standard 3.4. 
133. Id. at Standard 3.5.E. See also WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., http://www.opd.wa.gov 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
134. Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standard 3.4. 
135. Id. at Standard 3.6(A).  
136. Id. at Standard 13 (emphasis added). 
137. Lisa Tabbut is one such attorney. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. 
138. Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standard 13. 
139. Id. at Standard 5.2(A).  
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to governing attorneys and courts, not local governments.140 Although 
the standard directs local authorities to provide suitable funding,141 the 
attorneys are responsible for certifying their compliance with the 
standard.142 The attorneys must comply even if the local governments 
lack adequate funds.143 
Also, Standard 5.2 requires that attorneys have access to an office.144 
This requirement serves both (1) to facilitate private and accessible 
attorney-client communication, and (2) to stop defense attorneys from 
meeting their clients solely in a courthouse.145 The standards do not 
require the attorney to maintain an office solely dedicated to their public 
defender work.146 Rather, attorneys must simply have access to an 
office.147 
4. Attorney Qualification 
Finally, the Standards create professional qualifications on top of 
those demanded by the Rules of Professional Conduct.148 Attorneys 
representing criminal defendants must certify that they have adequate 
experience to handle particular types of criminal cases.149 The Standards 
set forth specific qualifications for various charges, including several 
levels of felonies, dependency cases, civil commitment cases, and 
appellate work.150 For example, to serve as lead counsel in a capital case, 
an attorney must have at least five years of criminal trial experience, 
served as lead counsel in at least nine jury trials, been lead counsel in at 
least one aggravated homicide case, and completed a death penalty 
140. Preamble, supra note 107 (“[T]he Court recognizes the authority of its Rules is limited to 
attorneys and the courts.”). 
141. Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standard 5.2.A. 
142. Id. at 13 (providing a standard certification of compliance). 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at Standard 5.2.B. 
145. If an attorney only meets her client in a courthouse, it is likely that the meeting is mere 
moments before a court appearance without time to hear client concerns. 
146. Compare Proposed New Rule CrR 3.1 Stds – Standards for Indigent Defense, WASH. 
COURTS, available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.proposedRuleDisplay 
Archive&ruleId=261 (last visited March 12, 2014) (“Standard 5.2 . . . : Public defense attorneys 
shall have an office. . . .”), with Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standard 5.2.B. 
(“Public defense attorneys shall have access to an office . . . .”). 
147. Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standard 5.2.B. 
148. See generally WASH. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT tit. I (“Client-Lawyer Relationship”). 
149. Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standard 14.2. 
150. Id. at Standards 14.2–14.4. 
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defense seminar.151 By contrast, to handle a misdemeanor case, an 
attorney need only meet the basic professional requirements required of 
all public defenders.152 
II. PRACTITIONERS’ OBJECTIONS PRIOR TO THE 
ENACTMENT OF THE STANDARDS 
The new caseload standards have been met with various criticisms 
from members of the Washington Bar. Many practitioners used the 
Court’s comment period to articulate concerns.153 The main critiques can 
be parsed into two overarching categories: (1) practical concerns with 
implementation and costs and (2) constitutional concerns regarding the 
Washington State Supreme Court’s exercise of power. The practical 
concerns focused on the inconvenience of the Standards and the 
difficulty many jurisdictions would have affording compliance with 
them.154 Constitutional concerns focused on funding problems and 
separation of powers issues.155 Within all of the criticisms, a divide 
exists between attorneys working for government and nonprofit offices 
and those who operate under a contract system, with government 
attorneys focused on the impact on clients and contract attorneys 
concerned with practical and fiscal impacts on the practice.156 
A. Practical Concerns Were Prominent 
Numerous comments on the proposed standards raised practical, 
professional concerns. These comments express three overarching 
themes: (1) the disparate reactions and language used by defenders in 
organized offices as compared to those who work under a contract—
particularly the fact that the former expressed more concerns for 
defendants; (2) concerns regarding the cost of compliance, particularly 
as it will affect how lucrative public defense work will be; and (3) 
151. Id. at Standard 14.2(A). 
152. Id. at Standard 14.2(K) (referencing the basic Standard 14.1). 
153. See generally infra Part II.A. 
154. See, e.g., Letter from Tricia R. Grove, Renton, Wash. attorney, to Wash. State Supreme 
Court (Oct. 31, 2011) (on file with author). 
155. See Letter from Hugh D. Spitzer, Foster Pepper PLLC, to Wash. State Supreme Court (Oct. 
31, 2011) (on file with author). 
156. Compare Letter from Ramona Brandes, Northwest Defender Association, to Washington 
State Supreme Court (Oct. 5, 2011) (on file with author) (discussing “representing clients” and 
whether “defendants receive representation by qualified attorneys”), with Letter from Grove, supra 
note 154 (expressing that “experienced lawyers” can handle a “significantly higher number of 
cases”) (emphasis added). 
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concerns with attorney qualification and office requirements. 
1. Salaried Public Defenders Expressed More Concern About 
Outcomes for Clients 
Attorneys working on a contract or appointment basis reacted 
differently to the Standards than those employed by organized public 
defender offices. Contract-based attorneys have real concerns regarding 
how their pay might be affected by the Standards, as well as with the 
difficulty of locating an office in which to meet clients.157 In general, 
there was a lack of concern expressed by contract attorneys—who were 
previously able to accept more cases at a higher profit—for defendants’ 
needs.158 
Of the comments that expressed specific concerns for defendants,159 
only two came from outside an organized government or nonprofit 
agency.160 Two persons writing on behalf of cities expressed concern 
that the new system may harm those persons who most need legal 
help.161 These concerns both derive from the assumption that, faced with 
a choice to either spend more on public defense or reduce crimes 
charged, local governments will choose the latter.162 One commentator 
believes defendants will be harmed if cited for violations rather than 
being charged with a crime;163 another is concerned with the inability to 
157. See generally Letter from Heather Straub, Law Offices of Heather R. Straub, PLLC, to 
Washington State Supreme Court (Sept. 7, 2011) (on file with author); Letter from Christopher 
Taylor, FT Law, P.S., to Washington State Supreme Court (Sept. 27, 2011) (on file with author); 
Letter from Suzanne Hayden, Staff Attorney, Juvenile Court, Clallam Pub. Def., to Washington 
State Supreme Court (Sept. 9, 2011) (on file with author) (all letters from attorneys expressing such 
logistical and financial concerns).  
158. Letter from Grove, supra note 154 (expressing that “experienced lawyers” can handle a 
“significantly higher number of cases”) (emphasis added).  
159. Though several expressed general concern or spoke to the importance of clients. 
160. See, e.g., Letter from The Defender Association to Washington State Supreme Court (Oct. 
31, 2011) (on file with author); Letter from the University of Washington to Washington State 
Supreme Court (Oct. 31, 2011) (on file with author); Letter from the Washington Association of 
Criminal Defense Attorneys to Washington State Supreme Court (Oct. 31, 2011) (on file with 
author); Letter from the Constitution Project to Washington State Supreme Court (Oct. 31, 2011) 
(on file with author) (letters coincidentally were all submitted on the final day of the comment 
period). 
161. Letter from Enron Berg, City Supervisor/Attorney, City of Sedro-Woolley to Washington 
State Supreme Court (Oct. 27, 2011) (on file with author); Letter from Kevin Yamamoto, City 
Attorney of Puyallup, to Washington State Supreme Court (Oct. 26, 2011) (on file with author).  
162. Letter from Berg, supra note 161; Letter from Yamamoto, supra note 161.  
163. Letter from Berg, supra note 161 (stating belief that, if law enforcement has to scale back its 
enforcement of certain crimes due to budget concerns, “we will be writing infractions for crimes 
and unintentionally denying the very same defendants this rule is intended to help access public 
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contest traffic infractions if a municipal court closed.164 
There are two responses to these concerns. First, attorneys who 
believe local governments incapable of funding public defense at the 
lighter caseload are mistaken. Grants are available through the OPD, and 
the implementation of these new standards serves as an opportune time 
for local authorities to demand more suitable funding from the state as 
well as from their own taxpayers.165 
Second, attorneys who expressed concern that a defendant’s due 
process rights will somehow be violated by issuing a traffic citation 
rather than criminal charge are similarly mistaken. If a jurisdiction 
approaches these Standards by de-criminalizing certain driving 
infractions, this is not a disservice to would-be defendants for several 
reasons. Yes, fewer court services may make it more difficult for 
recipients of traffic infractions to contest them.166 However, persons 
wishing to explain or dispute traffic citations may do so via letter if a 
more local municipal court were to close.167 And, most importantly, the 
notion that replacing a criminal charge with an infraction would have 
negative implications for those accused is shortsighted.168 A person who 
is cited—rather than charged—with small infractions such as Driving 
While License Suspended (DWLS) does not face the collateral 
consequences of conviction.169 A citation would likely be a much 
smaller inconvenience than the numerous court appearances required in 
defending against a criminal charge. To assume that de-criminalizing 
petty crimes is a disservice to accused persons is a creative—though 
inaccurate—way of critiquing the Standards.170 
defenders”). 
164. Letter from Yamamoto, supra note 161 (“In some situations, local governments may be 
forced to end localized prosecution and close municipal courts . . . . And, there will be collateral 
effects to recipients of traffic infractions who choose to contest their citations.”). 
165. See generally WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011 
(2011) (detailing grant funding disbursement and use over the year). 
166. See Letter from Yamamoto, supra note 161. 
167. See, e.g., Mitigation Hearing Form, CITY OF RENTON, available at http://rentonwa.gov/ 
uploadedFiles/Living/AJLS/MITIGATION%20BY%20MAIL%20RMC081.pdf (last visited Oct. 
17, 2013).  
168. See Letter from Berg, supra note 161. 
169. Collateral consequences include possible immigration consequences, a conviction of record 
interfering with public housing and employment applications, and/or the subsequent sentencing 
implications of having a prior criminal record. 
170. See, e.g., Letter from Yamamoto, supra note 161. 
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2. Increased Costs Will Cause Negative Consequences and Lower 
Attorney Compensation 
Many commentators were concerned with the cost of complying with 
the rule.171 Once public defense attorneys are limited in the cases they 
can handle, local governments may have to hire additional attorneys. 
These increased costs will be difficult to recover during a time of 
constrained local budgets.172 
Some people believed that jurisdictions would no longer be able to 
pay talented and experienced public defenders enough.173 Regarding 
attorney compensation, those who had previously relied on handling a 
high number of cases in order to reach a certain annual income face the 
most change under the new rule.174 Annual limits on cases will reduce 
the capacity of attorneys to accept more cases—or a higher proportion of 
a jurisdiction’s cases—in order to earn a higher income. Public defense 
contractors may no longer maintain a private practice to make ends 
meet. The greatest resistance to caseload limits comes from attorneys 
who may no longer be able to enjoy the same level of compensation for 
public defense work.175 
On the other hand, attorneys employed by an organized public 
defense office generally do not face the same dramatic shift that those 
appointed counsel under a contract would face.176 Most public defender 
171. See, e.g., Letter from John Marchione, Mayor of Redmond, to Wash. State Supreme Court 
(Oct. 24, 2011) (on file with author) (stating concern with the “unintended consequence” of hiring 
the cheapest public defenders possible); Letter from Yamamoto, supra note 161 (stating that 
experienced and effective defense attorneys can no longer afford to retain their positions).  
172. See, e.g., Brian Rosenthal, How Budget Constraints Narrowed Olympia’s DUI Crackdown, 
SEATTLE TIMES (June 26, 2013), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021277204_ 
duibillxml.html; How Budget Cuts Could Affect Washington State, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 24, 2013), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020428109_apwabudgetbattlewashglance2ndldwritethru.ht
ml (demonstrating Washington’s budget constraints). 
173. See, e.g., Letter from Marchione, supra note 155; Letter from Yamamoto, supra note 161. 
174. The general understanding is that attorneys overburden their caseload with misdemeanor 
representation; 150 felony cases per year is not a limit that is generally being pushed. See E-mail 
from Clarke Tibbits, Director of Kitsap County Office of Public Defense, to Author (Apr. 10, 2013, 
9:45 PST) (on file with author) (Kitsap County has limited defenders to 150 felonies per year; no 
one would be assigned more); Telephone Interview with Michael Kawamura, Director of Pierce 
County Office of Public Defense (Apr. 11, 2013) (notes on file with author) (caseload limits for 
felonies already practiced); E-mail from Ann Christian, Clark County Indigent Defense 
Coordinator, to Author (Apr. 1, 2013, 4:01 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter the author 
collectively refers to these three sources as “Correspondence with Defense Coordinators”]. 
175. Though concerned attorneys could demand better-paying contracts. See Jeff Barge, 
Defenders Seek Parity in Pay, Caseloads, 80 A.B.A. J. 24 (1994) (New York City defense attorneys 
went on strike for this reason). 
176. Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standard 13 (Though beyond the scope of this 
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offices already limit attorneys to a certain annual caseload, and attorney 
compensation tends to be on salary rather than contingent upon a certain 
number of cases taken.177 
a. Attorneys Who Previously Could Turn a Higher Profit Will Be 
Limited 
Caseload limits and the limits on private practice are the changes 
most likely to impact attorney compensation. An attorney paid per case 
or per a percentage of cases may be incentivized to disobey the limits or 
weight cases strategically. Additionally, attorneys who supplemented 
their public defense income with private practice work will now be 
limited to one full-time job where they were formerly able to work more 
than a full-time caseload.178 These problems seem most likely to occur 
where an attorney contracts with the local court, as compared to a 
position in a public defender’s or not-for-profit office.179 
3. Office and Qualification Requirements Are Unnecessary to Provide 
a Quality Defense 
Practitioners took issue with both the additional professional 
qualifications and the requirement to have access to an office in the 
Standards.180 Some felt that the culture of public defense work was being 
disrupted by the addition of these Standards. One attorney wrote, 
“[t]hese cases often do not pay well, and are not necessarily ‘regular 
Comment, a recent lawsuit caused the four nonprofit public defense agencies in King County to 
restructure. King County defenders face similar stress and uncertainty, though primarily due to the 
lawsuit and not the implementation of these Standards. See Council on Public Defense Meeting 
Minutes, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N (Feb. 1, 2013); Dolan v. King Cnty., 172 Wash. 2d 299, 258 
P.3d 20 (2011).  
177. See, e.g., 2003 Snohomish County List of Employees, Job Title and Salary, 
http://lbloom.net/xsnoh03.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013); 2012 Attorney Pay Plan, YAKIMA 
COUNTY HUMAN RES., http://www.yakimacounty.us/pers2/Pay%20Plans/2012% 
20Attorney%20Pay%20Plan.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2013); see also Spokane County Public 
Defender, supra note 49 (organized offices that pay defense attorneys a salary, Spokane County lists 
guidelines that predate the mandated standards). 
178. See Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32. Standard 13 allows this “full-time job” to be 
comprised of both private and public defense work, but attorneys may only accept private practice 
work to the extent that they are not handling a full-time public defense caseload. 
179. This assertion is based on the assumption that attorneys who receive a stable salary would 
not need to supplement their income with additional cases. See, e.g., Human Resources: Job 
Classifications and Pay, SPOKANE CNTY., http://www.spokanecounty.org/hr/ 
jobclassifications.aspx#P (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) (indicating the salary of Spokane County 
public defenders).  
180. See, e.g., Letter from Straub, supra note 157. 
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employment,’ which makes them attractive cases for newer attorneys to 
gain experience and attorneys who are slowing down their practice,” a 
very practitioner-focused concern.181 Others disfavored the requirement 
of an office, which has since been changed.182 
B. Concerns That the Washington State Supreme Court Exceeded Its 
Constitutional Authority Are Moot or Unlikely to Be Litigated 
The Association of Washington Cities expressed doubts as to the 
constitutionality of the Standards in an effort to halt their passage.183 The 
cities raised two complaints with the rule creating the Standards: (1) as a 
Court rule that compels funding, it is an illegitimate exercise of the 
judicial power; and (2) it fails to comply with the basic requirements of a 
Court rule.184 However, these concerns are either moot or unlikely to be 
litigated. 
1. The Rule Compels Funding and Is Thus Invalid 
The cities asserted: “[A]dequate funding for indigent defense services 
is, fundamentally, the responsibility of elected lawmakers.”185 The cities 
suggested that the rule unconstitutionally requires local authorities to 
expend funds.186 The cities pointed out that the standards “effectively 
order the expenditure by cities of substantial sums—and would do so not 
through the legislative process.”187 
This argument is based on the Washington State Constitution, which 
forbids the expenditure of state funds “except in pursuance of an 
appropriation by law.”188 However, in In re Juvenile Director,189 the 
Washington State Supreme Court held that the judiciary holds an 
inherent power to “compel funding of its own functions.”190 This power 
is limited to circumstances in which the Court demonstrates through 
181. Id. 
182. Now attorneys simply need “access to an office.” Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, 
at Standard 5. 
183. Letter from Spitzer, supra note 155. 
184. Id. (citing State v. Templeton, 148 Wash. 2d 193, 59 P.3d 632 (2002)). 
185. Id. at 1. 
186. The Standards do not mention funds, but if jurisdictions need to hire more public defenders, 
they arguably mandate funding indirectly. 
187. Letter from Spitzer, supra note 155 (emphasis added). 
188. See WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4. 
189. 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976). 
190. Id. at 249, 552 P.2d at 171. 
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“clear, cogent, and convincing proof of a reasonable need for additional 
funds,” and in which those funds are “reasonably necessary for the 
holding of court, the efficient administration of justice, or the fulfillment 
of its constitutional duties.”191 
The cities assert that the Court may only compel funding “in the 
context of a case in controversy.”192 This premise is based on basic 
separation of powers principles.193 The cities argue that, because the 
Standards are created without a case or controversy, they are an invalid 
exercise of the Court’s power.194 
2. The Rulemaking Approach Is Inappropriate 
The cities also argue that the Standards are an invalid exercise of 
rulemaking authority.195 The letter identifies such legitimate court rules 
as (1) the Electronic Filing Technical Standards for the Washington 
State Courts; (2) Courthouse Safety Standards; and (3) Washington State 
Child Support Schedule Definitions and Standards.196 These are 
distinguished from the Standards for Indigent Defense as they deal 
solely with internal workings of the court system—the appropriate scope 
of a court rule.197 The Standards, argue the cities, exceed this power by 
quasi-legislating, demanding that local governments expend funds in the 
form of public defender contracts and salaries.198 
3.  Inability/Unlikelihood of a Constitutional Challenge 
Despite these legitimate concerns, commenters indicate that the 
Standards are unlikely to face a constitutional challenge.199 This is due to 
(1) difficulties in determining standing, (2) a general resistance to 
confronting the Court, and (3) the fact that a constitutional challenge 
191. Id. at 250–51, 552 P.2d at 173–74. 
192. Letter from Spitzer, supra note 155. 
193. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (power is limited to “actions and proceedings”); State v. 
Superior Court for King Cnty., 148 Wash. 1, 267 P. 770 (1928).  
194. It may have been possible for the Court to take an ineffective assistance of counsel case and 
require annual caseload limits as part of its holding—a more explicit version of the discussion in 
A.N.J.—though this would be incredibly difficult. 
195. Letter from Spitzer, supra note 155. 
196. Id. 
197. See generally Hugh Spitzer, Court Rulemaking in Washington, 6 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 
31 (1982). 
198. Letter from Spitzer, supra note 155. 
199. See Interview with Hugh Spitzer, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Washington 
School of Law, in Seattle, Wash. (Apr. 8, 2013). 
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would have to be raised in the Washington State Supreme Court.200 First, 
local jurisdictions frustrated by the Standards will likely not have 
standing201 because they are not directly regulated by the rule.202 Second, 
attorneys who object to the new Standards are unlikely to personally 
confront the Court on this matter, in the interest of maintaining a good 
working relationship.203 Last, the only forum for a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Standards would be a state court.204 Eventually, 
in order to get the Standards overturned, the Court would have to deem 
unconstitutional the very order that it issued. While it may be possible 
for the Court to overturn its own court rule,205 such an outcome is highly 
unlikely.206 
III. LIFE AFTER THE STANDARDS: THE SKY HAS NOT 
FALLEN 
Over the above-mentioned protests, the Standards were enacted and 
became effective on September 1, 2012, save for Standard 3.4, the 
implementation of which is awaiting a time study by the OPD.207 In the 
short period of time since the Standards’ enactment, public defenders 
have been adapting to these changes. Thus far, none of the drastic 
outcomes anticipated by critics has been realized. 
A. Certification Has Gone Forward 
The first round of individual attorney certifications took place on 
October 1, 2012.208 Though this required administrative time in courts 
200. Id. 
201. See City of Seattle v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 663, 668, 694 P.2d 641, 645 (1985) (“The basic 
test for standing is ‘whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably 
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in 
question’”) (citing Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cnty. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 493, 585 P.2d 
71, 82 (1978)). 
202. See Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32. 
203. In order to challenge the Standards, attorneys would have to directly challenge the only 
governing body that has the power to discipline and disbar them. See WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, 
supra note 108. 
204. There would not be federal subject matter jurisdiction in a case challenging the Standards. 
205. Court rules may be examined and interpreted in the same manner as statutes. State v. 
McIntyre, 92 Wash. 2d 620, 622, 600 P.2d 1009, 1009–10 (1979).  
206. Even CrR 3.3, which applies a different standard than the constitutional right to a speedy 
trial, was not overturned by the Court, even given this difference. State v. Terranova, 105 Wash. 2d 
632, 651, 716 P.2d 295, 305 (1986); see generally Interview with Spitzer, supra note 199. 
207. With Standard 3.4 pertaining to caseload standards becoming effective January 2015. 
208. See WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., REPORT TO THE WASH. SUPREME COURT ON THE 
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across Washington, by all accounts it was an otherwise normal day, save 
for a few attorneys submitting late certifications.209 In a survey of court 
personnel, 88% experienced no problems during certification.210 Of the 
problems identified by the other 12%, most were minor difficulties with 
late forms, the higher workload for court personnel on that day, and a 
few “concerns about ambiguity of the Standards.”211 Discussions with 
public defense providers confirm this perception; certification requires 
administrative and staff time, but is manageable.212 Only one attorney 
refused to certify according to the new court rule.213 A follow-up survey 
performed by the OPD in March of 2013 indicates that certification 
continues to go smoothly, save for a handful of attorneys who fail to 
submit their certifications on time.214 
B. Some Attorneys Left the Practice 
It would be inaccurate, however, to claim that public defense practice 
has changed only in regards to additional paperwork. Three Benton 
County public defenders—Scott Johnson, Dan Arnold, and Kevin 
Holt—engaged in a two-month contract dispute in light of the new 
caseload limits.215 The dispute’s resolution cost the county nearly 
$48,000 to pay the remainder of the attorneys’ contracts and fees.216 The 
attorneys felt that they were already “grossly underpaid” for their work, 
and that caseload limits would reduce even that compensation.217 Three 
other attorneys resigned from Benton County around the same time.218 
While Benton County already limited its public defense attorneys to 150 
IMPLEMENTATION OF STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE: PURSUANT TO WASHINGTON SUPREME 
COURT ORDER NUMBER 25700-A-1013, at 2 (2013) [hereinafter OPD, REPORT TO WASH. SUPREME 
COURT]. 
209. See E-mail from Ann Christian, Clark County Indigent Defense Coordinator, to Author 
(Apr. 1, 2013, 4:01 PST) (on file with author). 
210. See OPD, REPORT TO WASH. SUPREME COURT, supra note 208, at 3.  
211. Id. 
212. See Correspondence with Defense Coordinators, supra note 174. 
213. Id. 
214. See OPD, REPORT TO WASH. SUPREME COURT, supra note 208. 
215. Paula Horton, Benton County to Pay Off 3 Public Defenders, TRI-CITY HERALD (Nov. 10, 
2012), http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2012/11/10/2165631_benton-county-to-pay-off-3-public.html.  
216. Id. One of the attorneys said, “Kevin and I were happy, given the circumstances, to take 
three extra months of pay without any additional work.” Id.  
217. Id. Though the county Indigent Defense Coordinator indicated that attorney compensation 
should actually increase when the caseload standards take effect.  
218. Paula Horton, 6 Benton County Public Defenders Resign, TRI-CITY HERALD (Sept. 8, 2012), 
http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2012/09/08/2091539/6-benton-county-public-defenders.html. 
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felony cases per year, the limitations on private practice appeared to be 
the cause of the attorneys’ dissatisfaction.219 At one point, only four 
attorneys remained on the defense panel to represent indigent clients in 
Benton-Franklin Counties, though positions were quickly filled.220 
C. Criminal Caseloads Are Already Decreasing 
Many pre-enactment concerns with the Standards revolved around 
budgetary impossibilities and the inevitable demand for increased 
funding.221 Yet the state has experienced savings in its criminal justice 
system from a variety of sources that have coincided with the enactment 
of the Standards as outlined below. Between 2008 and 2012, criminal 
case filings have decreased, with approximately 50,000 fewer 
misdemeanors filed and 5000 fewer criminal cases filed in superior 
court.222 
First, crime rates have steadily decreased since 1994, lessening the 
demand for defense attorneys.223 Second, some non-violent 
misdemeanors have been reclassified as civil infractions, which similarly 
reduces defense costs.224 Pierce County has decriminalized driving while 
license suspended in the third degree (DWLS-3), certain fishing 
violations, and failure to transfer title into civil penalties.225 Several city 
ordinances have been changed from misdemeanors to civil infractions.226 
And a recent piece of statewide legislation effective as of June 2013 
eliminates criminal charges for DWLS-3 for moving traffic violations.227 
The OPD believes this will reduce criminal charges in courts of limited 
219. The Herald reports, “A large percentage of the contract attorneys do private work on the 
side, and some also own law firms.” Id. 
220. The newly hired attorneys included Gary Metro, one of the attorneys who had previously 
resigned. He subsequently re-interviewed for his position and joined the defense panel. Paula 
Horton, Benton County OKs Defense Attorney Contracts, TRI-CITY HERALD (Dec. 23, 2012), 
http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2012/12/23/2215154/benton-county-oks-defense-attorney.html. The 
most prominent example of these reactions appears to be in the Benton-Franklin Counties’ shared 
offices, though it is feasible that other contract-based attorneys would leave the practice for more 
lucrative outlets. 
221. See, e.g., Letter from Spitzer, supra note 155; Letter from Straub, supra note 157. 
222. See OPD, REPORT TO WASH. SUPREME COURT, supra note 208, at 5.  
223. See id.  
224. See id. 
225. Id. at 5–6.  
226. See SUNNYSIDE, WASH. MUN. CODE tit. 5, ch. 5.02, § 020 (2013) (residential rental 
housing); SUNNYSIDE MUN. CODE tit. 5, ch. 42 (fireworks); SUNNYSIDE MUN. CODE tit. 9, ch. 34 
(nuisances); CHEHALIS, WASH. MUN. CODE tit. 6, ch. 4 (2013) (animal control); SEQUIM, WASH. 
MUN. CODE tit. 18, ch. 58 (2013) (sign code). 
227. See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.289 (2013); ESSB 6284 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012). 
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jurisdiction by six percent.228 
Second, Washington state voters legalized marijuana when they 
passed Initiative 502.229 Historically, about 4.1 percent of the criminal 
filings in courts of limited jurisdiction have been adults in possession of 
small amounts of marijuana.230 A significant reduction in criminal 
caseload is possible in light of this legalization.231 
Third, diversion programs for defendants charged with non-violent 
offenses and with little or no criminal history continue to drive down 
criminal filings.232 Between 2009 and 2012, almost twice as many 
cases—from 5.3% in 2009 to 9.7% in 2012—filed in courts of limited 
jurisdiction end in either a formal or informal diversion.233 Successful 
diversion programs have been offered in King, Snohomish, and 
Whitman Counties,234 as well as in Bellevue235 and Anacortes.236 
D. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon 
On December 4, 2013, Judge Robert Lasnik issued a decision in the 
case of Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon237 in which Joseph Jerome 
Wilbur sued on behalf of himself and others similarly situated for a 
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.238 The suit was brought by the 
American Civil Liberties Union and before the decision was rendered, 
the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) expressed interest in the 
228. See OPD, REPORT TO WASH. SUPREME COURT, supra note 208, at 6.  
229. See, e.g., Jonathan Martin, Voters Approve I-502 Legalizing Marijuana, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019621894_elexmarijuana07m.html. 
230. OPD, REPORT TO WASH. SUPREME COURT, supra note 208, at 7–8. 
231. Particularly after the U.S. Department of Justice’s recent announcement that it will not resist 
the Washington law. See Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says DOJ Will Let Washington, 
Colorado Marijuana Laws Go Into Effect, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/29/eric-holder-marijuana-washington-colorado-
doj_n_3837034.html. 
232. OPD, REPORT TO WASH. SUPREME COURT, supra note 208, at 10. 
233. Id. at 17. See also Spurgeon Kennedy et al., National Association of Pretrial Services 
Agencies, Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion, 16 (2006) (noting that not only do diversion 
programs reduce the impact of criminal cases on the criminal justice system, but also benefit the 
accused; the recidivism rate for successful felony diversion program participants is five percent). 
234. OPD, REPORT TO WASH. SUPREME COURT, supra note 208, at 19. 
235. Id. 
236. See Council on Public Defense Meeting Minutes, WASH. STATE BAR. ASS’N (Nov. 16, 
2012). 
237. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL, 2013 WL 6275319 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 
4, 2013). 
238. See supra Introduction (discussion of Mr. Wilbur’s case and his over-worked public 
defender). 
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outcome of the suit.239 The DOJ urged the Western District of 
Washington to consider an unprecedented remedial measure in a right to 
counsel case—the DOJ encouraged the court to authorize a federal 
watchdog to ensure defendants’ right to counsel would be honored.240 
Ultimately, Judge Lasnik determined that the caseloads being managed 
by Mount Vernon and Burlington’s public defenders were so large as to 
deprive criminal defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel: 
[The] attorney represents the client in name only in these 
circumstances, having no idea what the client’s goals are, 
whether there are any defenses or mitigating circumstances that 
require investigation, or whether special considerations 
regarding immigration status, mental or physical conditions, or 
criminal history exist. Such perfunctory “representation” does 
not satisfy the Sixth Amendment.241 
The Wilbur decision requires the cities of Mount Vernon and 
Burlington, which have relied on public defense attorneys taking as 
many as 1200 cases per attorney per year, to hire a part-time public 
defense supervisor.242 The public defense supervisor will monitor the 
work of public defenders, including the quality of their client contact, 
the use of investigators, the use of interpreters when needed, and 
communication of options to their clients.243 The decision marks a 
significant victory for those concerned with the quality of public defense 
and specifically discussed the impact of attorney caseload on this 
fundamental constitutional right.244 Unfortunately, Judge Lasnik’s 
decision refers to the Standards as “best practices to which the Cities 
aspire,” which glosses over their mandatory nature—and emphasizes the 
need for a meaningful enforcement mechanism so the Standards are not 
239. Wilbur, 2013 WL 6275319, at *1; see also Statement of Interest for the United States, 
Wilbur, 2013 WL 6275319. 
240. See Statement of Interest for the United States, Wilbur, 2013 WL 6275319; Mike Carter, 
Indigent-Defense Case Could Result in Federal Oversight of a Public-Defender Agency, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2013), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2021778422_ 
dojindigentdefense1xml.html. 
241. Wilbur, 2013 WL 6275319, at *7 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 
(1984)). 
242. Id. at *10. 
243. Id. at *10–12. 
244. The decision commends the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision to impose hard 
caseload limits (“[T]he Washington Supreme Court’s efforts in this area are laudable . . . .”), but 
rather than adopting the Standards as a Sixth Amendment requirement, determines that the 
workload undertaken by Mount Vernon and Burlington public defenders failed to provide the “time 
and effort necessary to ensure constitutionally adequate representation for the client,” largely due to 
the time constraints such a severe caseload would impose. Id. at *6.  
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treated simply as “best practices” or guidelines as previous efforts.245 
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS: THE STANDARDS ARE FAR 
FROM PERFECT 
Even as the Standards are timidly adopted, potential problems with 
their implementation and success may be identified based on what is 
already known about the Standards and as reflected by the concerns of 
experienced practitioners. Most prominent among these potential 
problems are (1) the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the Standards, 
(2) concerns with funding and attorney compensation, and (3) the 
potential for weighting cases in a strategic way so as to circumvent the 
purpose of the Standards. 
A. The Standards Lack a Meaningful Enforcement Mechanism 
The key piece missing from the Standards is a vehicle for 
enforcement.246 Attorneys are essentially on the honor system to certify 
that they comply with the standards; not even a penalty of perjury is 
indicated on the certification form.247 Due to the fragmented way that 
Washington regulates its public defense system,248 there is no central 
oversight; and the Washington State Supreme Court cannot discipline 
attorneys who fail to follow the Standards unless it is made aware of an 
issue. Unless a good reason exists to inquire into the authenticity of an 
attorney’s certification, the process could be easily manipulated—which 
could be reminiscent of the difficulties encountered before the 
Standards. 
The Washington State Supreme Court has the power to regulate 
attorneys.249 As demonstrated by the Continuing Legal Education (CLE) 
requirement, the Court may require attorneys to keep up with specific 
compliance requirements—and even risk losing their bar licenses for 
failure to do so.250 Washington attorneys must complete CLE hours and 
certify their compliance regularly to the court; falling behind either on 
the credit hours or the certification may result in suspension of their 
245. Id. at *2 n.4. 
246. The reader will remember that this same problem contributed to a lack of compliance with 
RCW section 10.101.030. 
247. See, e.g., Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Certification of Compliance.  
248. By county and municipality rather than a statewide agency. 
249. See supra Part I.D. 
250. See APR 11.6(c).  
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license.251 The Standards contain no such language authorizing the Court 
to suspend attorney licenses for failure to comply.252 
There are four possible solutions to this problem: (1) implementing 
the standards into bar discipline measures; (2) granting punitive 
authority to the OPD to sanction uncooperative jurisdictions; (3) the 
federal government could step in as an independent monitor; or (4) 
compliance with the standards could become a consideration when 
courts consider ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
First, the WSBA may include failure to comply or falsely certifying to 
compliance as appropriate grounds for bar sanctions.253 This was 
contemplated during the formation of the Standards and may still occur 
as implementation moves forward.254 Though the possibility of 
discipline may increase attorney accountability, the rarity of bar 
sanctions255 makes this mechanism better suited for extreme cases rather 
than as the primary method of enforcement. 
Second, the OPD could be given more authority to penalize local 
jurisdictions and individual attorneys who fail to comply with the 
Standards. The OPD already issues grants to local jurisdictions—but 
only those who demonstrate compliance with the Standards.256 To the 
extent that this is not already an incentive for jurisdictions to limit the 
amount of work their public defense attorneys may perform, OPD could 
be endowed with additional power to sanction non-compliant 
jurisdictions and lawyers.257 
Third, the federal government could be authorized to step in as an 
independent monitor. This was done for a six-year period in Grant 
251. Id. (“Any lawyer . . . who has not complied by the certification deadline . . . may be ordered 
suspended from the practice of law by the Supreme Court.”). 
252. See generally Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32. 
253. See Letter from Doug Ende, WSBA Disciplinary Counsel, to Chief Justice Madsen (Sept. 7, 
2012) (on file with author). 
254. See Council on Public Defense Meeting Minutes, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N (Oct. 26, 2012). 
However, bar sanctions are rare and would require another body to report an incompliant attorney. 
255. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Romero, 152 Wash. 2d 124, 94 P.3d 939 (2004). 
256. See WASH. STATE OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., supra note 165. 
257. A possibility that already exists in civil suits for damages. See Bill Morlin, $3 M Jury Award 
Shines Light on Public Defender Contracts, TRI-CITY HERALD (Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.tri-
cityherald.com/2009/02/01/465803/3m-jury-award-shines-light-on.html; Wilbur v. Mount Vernon, 
No. C11-1100RSL, 2012 WL 600727 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2012). The State may also look to 
agencies with more robust sanctioning powers such as the Office of Financial Management (OFM), 
or growth hearing boards which may deny incompliant plans outright both by denying funding and 
by appropriate sanctions. See Growth Management Hearings Boards, WASH. STATE, 
http://www.gmhb.wa.gov (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
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County through partnership with the DOJ.258 Federal monitoring would 
have to balance federalism concerns of state control,259 but would 
provide the benefit of independent expertise and save state court time 
and money.260 
Finally, if compliance directly affected the determination of effective 
assistance of counsel on appeal, both defenders and prosecutors would 
take notice. While defense attorneys were previously entitled to a 
presumption of effectiveness,261 the tide appears to be shifting for 
attorneys who take too many cases per year.262 One way to bolster the 
efficacy of the Standards would be for courts not to presume 
effectiveness when it can be established that an attorney did not comply 
with the Standards set forth by the state Supreme Court.263 Prosecuting 
attorneys would take care that their colleagues in the defense community 
were truly complying with the caseload limits, because a determination 
of ineffectiveness would undermine the soundness of criminal 
convictions. 
1. Entire Jurisdictions Could Weight Cases Too Lightly and 
Circumvent the Standards 
In addition to concerns about individual attorney enforcement, it may 
be possible for entire jurisdictions to work around the caseload limits by 
weighting regular cases as constituting less than one full case.264 Those 
working for-profit may have the incentive to weight cases as less than 
one in order to comply with the annual limits in the Standards. For 
example, attorneys paid by percentage of cases taken may be 
incentivized to weight cases as less than one in order to actually 
represent more clients and make more money. Similarly, municipalities 
that profit off of their municipal courts will be incentivized to give 
258. See Statement of Interest for the United States at 7, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. 
C11-1100RSL, 2013 WL 6275319 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 2013). 
259. Id. at 6. 
260. Id. at 5–6.  
261. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
262. See State v. A.N.J., 168 Wash. 2d 91, 112, 225 P.3d 956, 967 (2010) (setting forth factors 
for the court to consider in making a determination of ineffectiveness, including a discussion of 
indigent defense standards put forth by the WSBA). 
263. See Brief for The Defender Initiative and the Washington Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers as Amici Curiae for Defendant Maribel Gomez, In the Personal Restraint Petition of 
Maribel Gomez, No. 86711-9, 2013 WL 556306, at *1–2 (Wash. petition for review granted Sept. 6, 
2012) (this does not go so far as to suggest an excessive caseload creates a presumption of 
ineffectiveness). 
264. See supra Part I.D.1. 
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public defenders as many cases as possible by weighting cases 
downward.265 However, to utilize case weighting unilaterally would 
defeat the twin purposes of the caseload limits: to (1) improve the 
quality of defense provided to indigent clients and (2) make more 
reasonable the workload of public defense attorneys.266 
By November 2012, the OPD had received six proposed case 
weighting systems, none of which complied with the court’s 
Standards.267 Federal Way has since adopted a creative method by which 
to comply with the new Standards but also to maintain appointed 
defenders’ relatively large caseloads.268 In Federal Way’s proposed 
system, many misdemeanors are counted as only one-half or one-third of 
a case.269 The Washington State Supreme Court has since tasked the 
OPD to conduct a time study to determine appropriate case-weighting 
structures.270 Anacortes represents a jurisdiction that has adopted a “wait 
and see” approach to weighting cases until the Court renders a decision 
in light of this time study—despite concerns stemming from the 
successful lawsuit against Mount Vernon and Burlington.271 
B. Funding Must Be Adequate for This Constitutional Right 
Even if the implementation of the Standards results in additional 
expenditures, such funding is necessary. All indigent clients to receive 
representation from a public defender in compliance with caseload limits 
265. Municipal Courts generate revenue for several cities. See CITY OF BURLINGTON, 2012 
BUDGET 19–21 (the Municipal Court annually generates about $20,000 in revenue, $24,500 in 
criminal conviction fees, and over $70,000 in criminal misdemeanor penalties); CITY OF SEDRO-
WOOLEY, 2012 BUDGET 19, available at http://www.ci.sedro-woolley.wa.us/ 
Finance/documents/Budget/2012_Final_Budget.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) (the municipal court 
profits are split between the city and State, which receives 35%); CITY OF FEDERAL WAY, 
2011/2012 ADOPTED BUDGET 215, available at http://www.cityoffederalway.com/ 
DocumentCenter/Home/View/1487 (last visited Feb. 11, 2014) (the municipal court generates $1.5 
million in fines/forfeitures, allowing this budget item to break even). 
266. See Adoption of New Standards, supra note 32, at Standard 3.2 (“The caseload of public 
defense attorneys shall allow each lawyer to give each client the time and effort necessary to ensure 
effective representation.”). 
267. See Council on Public Defense Meeting Minutes, supra note 236, at 3. 
268. See Federal Way City Council Resolution 12-624 (2012). 
269. For example, Carrying or Display of Weapons is counted as one-third, Disorderly Conduct is 
one-third, and certain forms of Fraud are counted as one-third or one-half of a case. Id. 
270. See Indigent Defense Implementation, supra note 38. 
271. Kimberly Jacobson, Increases for City Prosecutor, Public Defender, GOANACORTES.COM 
(Oct. 30, 2013), available at http://www.goanacortes.com/news/entry/increases_ 
for_city_prosecutor_public_defender (last visited Dec. 22, 2013); see also Wilbur v. Mount Vernon, 
No. C11-1100RSL, 2013 WL 6275319 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 2013). 
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will likely require hiring more defenders. To be sure, there is a limit to 
the amount of funding a local government—even assisted by the state—
will be able to provide. The progression shown in Mount Vernon and 
Burlington, discussed in the Wilbur v. Mount Vernon case, shows the 
additional costs of hiring more and more attorneys to handle the public 
defense caseload.272 In the years following Sybrandy and Witt’s 
excessive caseload, the cities implicated in the Wilbur lawsuit hired a 
law firm—with more than two attorneys—to handle its public defense 
caseload.273 As the lawsuit advanced, and after the Standards were 
enacted, the law firm hired additional attorneys to make progress 
towards compliance with the standards.274 
This scenario, however, is only made manifest if a jurisdiction 
continues to charge crimes at the same rate as before the Standards were 
implemented. A combination of reduced criminal charges, particularly 
for smaller non-violent offenses, with increased funding by the state and 
local authorities, would easily curb a budget crisis. Local jurisdictions 
retain total control over the entire criminal caseload—and thus, its 
associated costs—through the power of its law enforcement and 
prosecuting attorneys’ offices.275 
In the alternative, recognizing the importance of charging persons 
with crimes that endanger local communities, local jurisdictions may 
consider alternatives to incarceration that may result in savings such as 
drug treatment programs, mental health wellness courts, and/or 
restorative justice models.276 When faced with limited resources, 
communities may be enabled to consider more rehabilitative options for 
young and new offenders that serve not only to better address the cause 
of the criminal activity, but to reserve social resources for incapacitating 
and prosecuting those who present graver danger to their communities. 
There are also savings to be found elsewhere in the criminal justice 
272. Wilbur, 2013 WL 6275319, at *2–3 (demonstrating the progression from Sybrandy and Witt 
to hiring a firm named Mountain Law, which subsequently had to keep hiring additional attorneys).  
273. Id.  
274. Id. 
275. Based on the power of local District Attorneys’ offices to pursue or dismiss criminal 
charges. 
276. See, e.g., Adult Drug Courts, WASH. COURTS, http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_dir/?fa= 
court_dir.psc&tab=2 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013); Mental Health Courts, WASH. COURTS, 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_dir/?fa=court_dir.psc&tab=5 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013); LEAD: 
Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion, LEAD KING COUNTY, http://leadkingcounty.org (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2013) (pre-booking diversion for low-level drug and prostitution crimes rather than 
traditional prosecution). 
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system. Efforts to decriminalize or divert charges have led to savings.277 
This movement will continue to reduce collateral consequences to the 
accused, limit the burden on public defenders, and provide savings to the 
court system. The decriminalization of certain marijuana possession 
charges278 is especially likely to generate savings. Between 
misdemeanor diversion programs and the legalization of marijuana, a 
significant reduction in Washington’s criminal caseload may already be 
anticipated.279 
Of paramount importance is the simple fact that this is not a request 
for taxpayer funds for a novel piece of programming. Rather, this is 
funding necessary to defend a fundamental constitutional right, which 
has not been adequately protected in its fifty years of existence.280 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
For the new Standards to be successful, (1) a meaningful enforcement 
mechanism should be implemented, (2) funding solutions can be assisted 
by jurisdictions continuing their efforts to decriminalize non-violent 
misdemeanors and utilize diversion programs, and (3) counties should 
more meaningfully assess how various cases are weighted using the 
OPD time study. 
A. Individual Enforcement Mechanism 
The Washington State Supreme Court should seriously consider 
bolstering the enforceability of the Standards in two ways: (1) first, by 
including language in the Standards that indicate their mandatory nature, 
and (2) by empowering the OPD to serve additionally as public defense 
supervisors, borrowing from Judge Lasnik’s decision in Wilbur.281 
First, the Standards should contain language emphasizing that they 
are requirements, so as to avoid the perception that they represent merely 
277. See supra Part III.C. 
278. See WASH. STATE OFFICE OF FIN. MGMT, FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT (1–502) (2012). 
279. See supra Part III.C. 
280. Washington has recently been reminded of its duty to adequately fund public education in 
McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227 (2012). Political reactions, however, seem to 
embrace the education requirement while ignoring the State’s duty to fund defense for its indigent 
defendants. Meanwhile, a right identified by the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright and 
revisited in the years since remains a difficult one to sell and defend politically. See, e.g., 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Lafler v. Cooper, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), 
Missouri v. Frye, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
281. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL, 2013 WL 6275319, at *10–12 (W.D. 
Wash. Dec. 4, 2013). 
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“best practices” to which attorneys and jurisdictions aspire.282 This could 
be as simple as the language already existing in the certification 
requirement regarding Continuing Legal Education—clear, plain 
language that indicates attorneys are subject to suspension if they fail to 
comply with the Standards and certification requirements.283 
The CLE requirement contains the language: “Any lawyer . . . who 
has not complied by the certification deadline . . . may be ordered 
suspended from the practice of law by the Supreme Court.”284 This 
Comment suggests the Standards include language along similar lines: 
“Any lawyer who has not complied with the Standards, or submitted 
certification to the court by the deadline, may be ordered suspended 
from the practice of law by the Supreme Court.” 
Second, a non-partisan public defense supervisor is likely to be 
successful in helping achieve the goals of the Standards. Researchers 
have agreed that independent supervision is a preferred method of 
improving the delivery of public defense services.285 Rather than relying 
on the U.S. government to step in and provide this monitoring (as was 
previously done in Grant County),286 the state OPD could be expanded 
to include this supervisory role. The OPD houses sufficient expertise 
regarding public defense, but also—as an extension of the judicial 
branch of government—the nonpartisan quality necessary to ensure fair 
and consistent quality across Washington’s numerous jurisdictions.287 
The need for such neutral, professional oversight is abundantly clear 
not only from the historic problems in implementing qualify public 
defense in the fifty years since the Gideon decision, but was also 
recently articulated by Judge Lasnik in the Wilbur decision: 
[T]he Court has grave doubts regarding the Cities’ ability and 
political will to make the necessary changes on their own. The 
Cities [demonstrated an] unwillingness to accept that they had 
any duty to monitor the constitutional adequacy of 
representation provided by [their] public defenders . . . . [A] 
282. An unfortunate characterization of the Standards given in the Wilbur decision. See Wilbur, 
2013 WL 6275319, at *5 n.4. 
283. See supra Part IV.A. 
284. APR 11.6(c). 
285. See FAROLE & LANGTON, supra note 43, at 4 (“[T]he public defense function should be 
independent of undue political influence . . . a nonpartisan board should oversee defender 
systems.”). 
286. Statement of Interest for the United States at 7, Wilbur, 2013 WL 6275319. 
287. See WASH. REV. CODE § 2.70.005 (2008). 
 
                                                     
15 - Woods Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/26/2014  2:53 PM 
2014] REASONABLE CASELOADS FOR PUBLIC DEFENDERS 253 
declaration will not be sufficient to compel change.288 
Where, as here, a constitutionally protected right is not met with 
political will to defend it, oversight by the nonpartisan judicial branch 
(specifically via the OPD, whose members are not elected) seems a 
natural choice. The Wilbur decision suggested the following duties be 
assigned to the Mount Vernon and Burlington public defense supervisor: 
monitoring client contact, using interpreters, using investigators, 
evaluating public defender communication with clients, and quarterly 
collecting fifteen randomly chosen files to assess the quality of defense 
being provided to clients.289 This Comment suggests the Washington 
State Supreme Court should adopt Judge Lasnik’s reasoning and charge 
the OPD with those oversight duties for every county in the state. This 
would require adequately funding the OPD to be able to hire the 
necessary staff to undertake this enhanced role. 
1. Municipalities Should Engage in More Meaningful Case-
Weighting of Various Criminal Charges 
As mentioned previously, a handful of jurisdictions have already 
proposed plans to weight cases lightly, thus resisting a change to current 
structures while also bringing themselves in compliance with the new 
Standards.290 In order to prevent jurisdictions from simply weighting 
cases too lightly in order to avoid complying with the Standards, the 
Court has already taken a reasonable step by requiring the OPD to 
conduct a time-study to determine what reasonable case weighting can 
and should look like.291 Particularly in light of the decision in Wilbur v. 
Mount Vernon, jurisdictions should consider carefully the criteria for 
weighing cases rather than simply trying to weight cases in such a way 
as to squeeze heavier caseloads into compliance. 
288. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL, 2013 WL 6275319, at *9 (W.D. Wash. 
Dec. 4, 2013). 
289. Id. at *10–12. 
290. See supra Part IV.C.  
291. See supra note 38. The Court recently issued another order requiring that jurisdictions 
conduct time studies in order to determine how misdemeanor cases should be weighted; the annual 
limits on caseload standards will thus become effective January 2015. The other requirements of the 
Standards must be certified to as of October 1, 2013. Indigent Defense Implementation, supra note 
38. 
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B. Funding Must Be Located: A Continued Decriminalization of Non-
Violent Misdemeanors Would Provide Numerous Financial 
Benefits 
In order to hire enough public defenders to manage a criminal 
caseload, and especially if the Court considers tasking the OPD with an 
enhanced supervisory role, both the State and local governments will 
likely need to locate additional funding for its public defense delivery. 
This, however, is not an impossible feat. To begin with, savings can be 
located elsewhere in the criminal justice system by a continued 
decriminalization of certain infractions. 
Jurisdictions can and should continue to decriminalize such minor, 
non-violent infractions as driving while license suspended. Such 
decriminalization would serve to ameliorate overburdened public 
defenders—and conserve limited resources—in three simple ways. First, 
though it seems obvious, the decriminalization of these crimes would 
mean fewer criminal cases would be charged and thus would serve as an 
instant reduction in public defender caseloads. Second, the savings that 
would trickle down throughout the criminal justice system—by reducing 
court time, incarceration costs, and law enforcement efforts—could 
benefit the remainder of the criminal justice system by enabling defense 
attorneys to devote more hours to their caseload regarding defendants 
facing other, more serious criminal charges. Third, revenue could be 
generated by transferring such crimes as Driving While License 
Suspended to a civil citation and a fine. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the constitutional significance of a fair and effective public 
defender system, it is immensely difficult to gain political support for the 
rights of indigent defendants.292 It may be for this reason that the 
Court—arguably in a stretch of its constitutional powers293—decided to 
act proactively to ensure that a poor person’s right to a fair trial be 
honored by enacting the Standards for Indigent Defense. While it is a 
slow-moving process towards a change in social attitudes, increased 
empathy for accused persons would be monumentally helpful in 
ensuring that measures such as the Standards work effectively. 
292. Judge Stephen Warning notes, “It’s tough to go to the Legislature and say people who are 
accused of crimes . . . need your help. . . . We can’t exactly do a telethon for them.” Armstrong & 
Mayo, supra note 25. 
293. See supra Part II.B. 
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Similarly, the resistance of some defense attorneys—particularly 
those who have up until now represented defendants at least partially for 
profit294—needs to be re-examined. While the Standards represent what 
is, for some, a dramatic shift in their relationship to this work, they too 
represent an opportunity to demand reasonable and fair workloads for 
public defenders. Now is a chance for attorneys defending the indigent 
to demand fair compensation for a reasonable annual caseload, and for 
adequate assistance with associated costs such as hiring investigators, 
sharing an office, and securing conflict counsel.295 
The Standards for Indigent Defense, like all structural changes, will 
require time and effort in order to be successful. Yet this time and 
effort—to be undertaken primarily by attorneys and local leaders—is 
more than an inconvenience. The Standards properly elevate poor 
defendants’ needs over the professional concerns of attorneys. They 
seek, in one small yet significant way, to fulfill the promise begun with 
Clarence Gideon, that ours is a system in which “every defendant stands 
equal before the law”296 and which ensures “substantial equality and fair 
process . . . where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf 
of his client.”297 Fifty years have passed since the United States Supreme 
Court recognized the right to assistance of counsel and required states to 
fulfill that need. As Judge Lasnik put it in the Wilbur decision, “The 
notes of freedom and liberty that emerged from Gideon’s trumpet a half 
a century ago cannot survive if that trumpet is muted and dented by 
harsh fiscal measures that reduce the promise to a hollow shell of a 
hallowed right.”298 These Standards need not be the end of the world for 
attorneys who wish to meaningfully and effectively represent indigent 
defendants; indeed, they represent a new beginning. 
 
294. Those who worked under a contract as mentioned in Part I. 
295. New York City public defenders were able to successfully strike to demand better conditions 
before the city’s system was restructured. See Barge, supra note 175.  
296. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). By extension, under the equal rights 
argument, a defendant’s poverty cannot impede his right to a quality defense. See Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963) (“There is lacking that equality demanded by the 
Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel’s 
examination into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while 
the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is 
forced to shift for himself.”). 
297. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  
298. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL, 2013 WL 6275319, at *23 (W.D. 
Wash. Dec. 4, 2013). 
 
                                                     
